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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
UTAH COPPER COMPANY, a
Corporation,
Respondent,
vs.
ELIAS A. SMITH and FRANCIS B. CRITCHLOW, Trustees, and MONTANA-BINGHAM CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, a Corporation,
Appellants.
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The "Last Word" or Appellants' Reply To
Respondent's Second Brief.
In replying to "Respondent's Anstver to Appellants'
Reply Brief" we are not merely indulging in our right to
the proverbial "last word"—we are further burdening
the Court only because we feel it is our duty to call the
Court's attention to certain statements made by respondent and for the purpose of correcting confusion. The
assertions found between the covers of respondent's last
volume of argument sound somewhat as though emanating
a deo et rege—(from God and the King). When analyzed,
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however, in place of logic or even arbitrary asseveration,
respondent is merely artistically indulging in petitio principii,—"begging the question."
Counsel assert: '' Respondent 's dump intercept these
waters in the course of such descent, captures them; retains them/'
But does it capture them? Does it retain
them? Again, respondent says: " T h a t dump and every
substance therein is the absolute property of respondent,
the right of which is to follow and recover its said property whenever and wherever the same may be found.'' But
is this true ? According to the theory of respondent advanced in the former brief they do not seek, nor do they
claim ,the right to recover the percolating waters even
though such right were accorded them by the lower court.
Let's test the question for a moment. My manure
lies upon my own property on the hilltop. Therefrom (in
the language of the lower court, respondent's last brief
page 12), there is "exuded a substance which spreads
over the g r o u n d " percolating beneath the surface and
passing down upon the worthless land of my neighbor
below. Could I take my neighbor's enriched soil because
I had permitted my manure pile to lie out in the weather?
True, I might haughtily say, in the language of respondent, " W h a t can it matter that the valuable abstraction
or exudation is mixed with earth or water ?'' My neighbor might well reply: "Nevertheless, you left it there;
if you don't want your dung to run off—haul it a w a y ! ' '
And that's just the answer here. The dump and contents
are the absolute property of the respondent only if and
when it removes it. Until then, and while the Utah Cop-
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per deliberately permits it to remain upon our land, it is
subject to the action of the elements. It is not lost property. But, just as the " a i r we breathe, the air encountered
in passing to and f r o " (last brief respondent, page 4)
goes on to the next land owner who has an equal right to
breathe,—so here, deliberately, and with knowledge of
all the conditions, subject to the limitations naturally following such conditions, this worthless dump has been
placed on our land, and the waters flowing down through
the dump come upon the surface and beneath the soil
of our ground. We have the same right to breathe on our
land and to allow the air to pass, as they have to breathe
on their easement " t h e air encountered in passing to and
fro."
The solution of the whole question is found in the application of elementary principles of law. Their assumption of absolute title is not correct. The rights of the
Utah Copper Company, as the owner of the easement, is,
nevertheless, subject to our correlative rights as owner
of the fee. We have already discussed this subject in our
former brief, and have cited authorities showing the
limited rights of the owner of an easement. But let's
proceed one step further. If the judgment here stands,
the Utah Copper Company MAY DEMAND, as the reward for our enterprise in creating value from their confessedly worthless dump, an accounting and recover from
us for all the copper we have reclaimed since 1920. More
than this; as we have repeatedly stated hitherto, carrying counsel's argument to its logical conclusion, the Utah
Copper Company may recover from us copper rock in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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place within our property, part of our very mining ground,
because the same has been enriched from the copper solutions leached from the dump. Why not? According to
the case quoted by counsel at page 14 of their brief (Buckley vs. Gross) we are plain ordinary thieves; the title
has never passed. We hold what does not belong to us.
Of course counsel are mistaken, and in error because they
refuse to recognize the perfectly obvious distinction made
in the law behveen property accidentally lost and this condition designedly created.
We have quoted from Duvall vs. White, 189 Pac. 324,
recognizing the rule as to water, oil and gas and other
fugacious substances. All of these cases show clearly
that after fugitive minerals pass from the land of the first
proprietor his right thereto is gone and he may not reclaim. But counsel ignore all of these cases. The only
answer respondent makes is, in effect, to inquire: "How
dare you oppose us?"
Respondent seemed to be irritated at its last writing.
We find in respondent's answer to appellants' reply brief
the suggestion that we have indulged in "astonishing dissertation. ' ' There is a hint that we have been remarkably
audacious. There is even an oblique charge that Mr. Pett
is lacking in good morals,—all of which, however, is not
argument.
Respondent (referring to its pretended reservoir)
asserts that it is merely closing the "leaks" in the barrel.
L E A K S ! ! "I thank thee for teaching me that word!"
Suppose the water ' l e a k s " from the gutter of a roof or
"leaks" exist in a rain barrel. May the owner of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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roof, or the owner of the barrel dig up his neighbor's
garden? Does the owner of the barrel, or of the roof,
when the water ' l e a k s " upon his neighbor's ground "continue through such percolation # # the absolute owner
thereof, with the untrammeled right to dispose of said
water a s " (his) "advantage might dictate?" " L E A K S ! "
That is simply another name for percolating or passing
through. The so-called " r e s e r v o i r " and a sieve "leak,"
and "leak" in about the same proportions. Counsel say:
" C a n it be possible that B would not have the right to
calk up and close the " l e a k s " in the " b a r r e l ? " Yes; by
all means you may water-proof every grain of material
you place on our ground, or you may take your old barrels
and go home. But, if the dump remains, it remains subject
to the action of the elements, and you have no right to concrete the surface of our ground, nor do you "continue
throughout such percolation the absolute owner of such
water." We retain, by the express terms of the grant, the
right to mine at the surface. We retain all rights below the
surface. You merely have a "limited estate,—limited as to
dimensions, height, depth and length." (Citizens Telegraph Co. vs. Cincinnatti N. 0. & T. P. R. Co., and other
eases cited in our former brief).
Counsel have not furnished the court with a single
authority which disputes these propositions. On the contrary they have stated again and again that the propositions of law we rely upon are elementary. Indeed, the
rule could not be denied, though the denial came from
6i
God and the King.''
" L E A K S " ! ! Inadvertently our friends let slip
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the real situation. The water leaks down so fast that, as
stated by their own witnesses " a t certain times the dump
is perfectly dry as far as can be seen." Yet, in spite of
the admission that the " b a r r e l " or "reservoir " (?) leaks,
counsel rather scold the writer of this brief because he
made an offer of proof which was accepted as evidence,
but objected to as immaterial. And respondent, at page
20 of their brief, make the following statement:
" I t appears from the uncontradicted testimony
that in order to secure and solely for the purpose
of securing, the copper laden water in respondent's
dump, the appellants not only were compelled to
drive what they call a 'water drift' directly under
the fill of the D. & R. G. W. R. R., but to make a
raise in such fill to a heighth of 15 to 20 feet and
thus tap the 'barrels' or reservoir of this respondent and deprive it of its water held in its dump
and containing the only value which appellants
sought to appropriate, namely, the copper held in
solution.97
There is absolutely no justification in the record for
the above statement. The maps and the testimony clearly show that the point where appellants intercept and
divert these waters is a considerable distance down the
gulch from any ground occupied by respondent, and is
from 150 to 200 feet away from the lower end of respondent's dump. If the diverting by us of waters flowing and
percolating through the soil and crevices down the bottom
of the gulch,—waters which have left plaintiff's dump
and passed under the fill of the D. & R. G.,—is "tapping' 1
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respondent's so-called ''reservoir.'L ''Make the most of
i t ! " How could it be? As well say a ditch dug below
and down Salt Lake valley where the waters ultimately
flow could be considered "tapping" respondent's reservoir !
The assertion made in our reply brief that the Montana Bingham Consolidated Mining Company upraised
from the cross-cut tunnel 15 feet, but only to the surface
of the natural ground under the fill and not into the fill
of the D. & R. G. R. Co., is fully borne out by the record.
Mr. Billings had immediate charge of the work and emphatically denied the assertion of respondent's counsel
that the upraise extended into the fill at all. (Tr. 206-7).
Mr. Pett was cross-examined concerning an inter-office
letter of the Montana Bingham Consolidated Mining Company,—a copy of which the respondent had in some mysterious way procured. And without being shown the letter, was questioned rather viciously (it seems to us) in an
attempt to confuse the situation. But the testimony of
Mr. Pett is not at variance with the evidence of Mr. Billings, nor is the letter which has already been quoted. On
the contrary, Mr. Pett's answers are wholly consistent
with his idea that the upraise was within the surface limits
of the D. & R. G. R. R. Co. fill. He was not asked at all
how far, if to any extent, the upraise was into the fill. The
testimony of Mr. Billings, which we cited, and indeed the
whole record, shows clearly that the water coming down
the gulch under the D. & R. G. R. R. fill percolates through
the natural soils and crevices,—part flowing along the
natural surface of the bottom of the gulch at bed rock,
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has been intercepted by the Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Company, and the same situation exists
further up the gulch under and beneath the soil at the lower end of respondent's dump where respondent seeks the
right to dig out the ground for the purpose of taking
therefrom the percolating waters. On the other hand,
respondent's counsel build up a mighty " r e s e r v o i r " (?)
with an overflow, or spill-way. But to make their case
they must, not only by imagination transform the dump
into a " r e s e r v o i r , " they must join thereto another
imaginary reservoir, (?) viz: the D. & E. Gr. E. E. fill.
They must further contend (although without reason)
that this last " r e s e r v o i r " in some mysterious manner
(which Mr. Goodrich in effect says he does not understand)
belongs to them. Having thus on a fallacious premise
prepared for the conclusion, they then say, (without justification in the record) that the appellants have upraised
15 feet into this fill (the fill of the D. & E. G. E. Co.) and
are tapping their reservoir to secure the water. We are
content to rest upon the record, and we submit that it
justifies our assertion as to what it shows. It further
justifies our contention that respondent is given, by the
judgment appealed from, the right to deprive appellants
of percolating waters and surface waters that have passed
out of the dump and into our ground and are already
diverted to a public use by appellants.
After all, the theory of the case must be determined
from the pleadings, the evidence adduced, and the decree
entered, rather than from the briefs filed in the appellate
court. Eespondent has discarded the theory upon which
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it proceeded to trial and upon which it persuaded the trial
court to grant the judgment here for review. We remind
the court of the language of the complaint (paragraph 9),
—the only excuse offered for this extraordinary exercise
of the right of eminent domain. There the pleader says
that it "does not appear from said agreement" (the grant
of easement) " t h a t said plaintiff has the right * # to
enter beneath the surface thereof" (that is, beneath the
surface of the mining claims) " f o r that purpose and excavate and construct tunnels or underground works to collect the waters containing the said copper in solution/9
Mr. Goodrich, plaintiff's chief engineer, testified:
(Abs. 37-38).
" A N D BY THAT MEANS we contemplate
securing at this lowest place all the water that
conies out of the dump, all the water that percolates below."
Mr. Earl testified:

(Abs. 56).

" I don't know how far this water that percolates through the dump goes into the ground. I
don't think anyone can say. I T PROBABLY
DOES GO DOWN INTO T H E GROUND, but it
also appears on the surface. I F OUR TUNNEL
IS DOWN BELOW W H A T W A S T H E SURF A C E OF T H E GROUND PRIOR TO T H E
DUMPS BEING PLACED T H E R E I T WILL,
OF COURSE, COLLECT T H E W A T E R THAT
IS BELOW T H E DUMP, BELOW T H E BOTTOM OF T H E DUMP, it will, as to the amount
that is in that depth of the tunnel.''
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And we respectfully ask the court to bear in mind the
fact that the " d e p t h of the t u n n e l " is undefined, and
under the condemnation proceedings here the respondent
may go with its tunnel to the center of the earth.
The court found (Finding No. 7, Abs. 151):
"In order to collect said waters containing
said copper in solution, as aforesaid, and to enable
the same to be conducted through such pipe lines
to such precipitating vats or tanks, it is necessary
to excavate and construct a tunnel and short
branches therefrom beneath the surface of a portion of the mining claims and mining properties
of the defendants above named."
And the court concludes: (Conclusion of Law No. 3,
Abs. 156-7).
" A n d although such water and solutions in
said dump or deposit should percolate through the
natural surface soil beneath said dump and upon
the mining claims of the defendants before the
plaintiff should have collected, conserved, or diverted the same, plaintiff would not be thereby
divested of said title, but on the contrary plaintiff
would continue throughout such percolation until,
upon and subsequent to plaintiff's collection and
diversion of said waters and solutions the absolute
owner thereof, with the untrammeled right in plaintiff to dispose of said waters and solutions as plaintiff's advantage might dictate."
Upon such a record we cannot understand how able
counsel fatuously contend there is not involved here the
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law applicable to surface and percolating waters. Counsel in a rather superior manner brush all aside, by referring to these waters as "meteoric." In the name of common sense! ! where do the waters come from anyway?
What is the source of the waters which fall from heaven?
When waters reach the surface, flow upon the surface
and percolate below, are they any the less surface and percolating waters because the waters accumulate from rain
and snow. Eespondent alleges in its complaint that the
waters are percolating i' through their dump and through
the surface of our ground." All of their witnesses say
that these waters go into our ground. At the trial they
frankly conceded that the very thing they desire is to
collect the waters underneath the surface of our ground.
The court in its findings and conclusions (presumably
prepared by counsel for respondent) not only finds that
these waters do percolate into our ground, but concludes
therefrom that in spite of that fact respondent "remains
the absolute owner of these waters with the untrammeled
right to dispose of said waters * * as plaintiff's advantage might dictate.''
There was one virtue in respondent's theory at the
trial. Counsel at the trial were at least consistent. And,
being consistent, upon the theory indicated in the complaint and the evidence and findings above outlined, the
decree of condemnation, although erroneous in law, is in
harmony.
But having obtained a decree for condemnation, counsel now want to uphold it, and in its brief in this court,—
in utter disregard of the pleadings and the record,—it
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seeks to argue that there is no law involved in the case.
All it asks is a determination of the question of ownership
of the waters while in (?) the plaintiff's dump. The query
of his Honor, Justice Frick, was most pertinent: " I f what
is really involved here is simply the collection of the waters
in the dump while there, and at the surface, why seek to
excavate underneath defendants' ground;—why resort to
eminent domain proceedings for this purpose at all ?? ?
So, in spite of the impatience of counsel for respondent, we submit that we were and are justified in treating
this case as involving fundamentally the question of surface and percolating waters.
But counsel's imaginative genius takes wing heavenward. They compare these waters with the birds of the
air,—like the meteor in its flight. These waters they say
are the property of any one until captured, and (forsooth!) they have captured them! F o r nineteen years
these waters apparently have been in captivity. They say:
" B y what authority does the owner of the fee have any
right, title or interest in the rain or snow in the course
of their descent upon his surface?" We do not presume
that the court is interested in speculating concerning these
waters " i n the course of their descent." The question
here is as to the rights of the parties after these waters
have reached the surface. In other words, the law suit
here is with respect to the right of the plaintiff to " e n t e r
beneath the surface thereof" (that is of our mining
claims) * * and excavate and construct tunnels or
underground works to collect the waters.' J L E T ' S STICK
TO T H E GROUND! !
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We have already incidentally referred to what counsel in their answer to appellants' reply brief term " a r e
astonishing dissertations concerning barrels stored on another 's ground." We thought we had made our position
perfectly clear. Counsel's speculations may be interesting, but they lead us far afield.
In our reply brief we stated: (page 7).
i

' To the extent that the personal property may
become saturated with the water so that it is not
recoverable by the owner of the land there would
necessarily be an incidental burden falling upon
the land-owner. 9 '
This statement makes unncessary the speculations of
counsel with respect to B's barrels upon A's property.
Counsel cite no new authorities for their contention
that even meteoric waters may be captured by anyone
as against the owner of the land upon which the waters
fall. They content themselves with the statement that
they cited the authorities in their opening brief with respect to the right to capture these waters; but we have
shown that in each of the cases cited the person who
claimed the ownership of the water by reason of capture
was the owner of the land upon which the water fell, and
that it was only while so captured, and not after the barrel
" l e a k s " and the water flows upon the land of another,
that there is any such right of ownership.
Counsel at a rather late day, it seems to us, joyously
criticise our explanation of the chemical changes which
occur in the leaching process and in replacement. True,
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respondent does not seem to attach any particular significance to any of this. The criticism is evidently injected
merely to show superior knowledge. We are quite willing
to rest this proposition upon the opinions of the geologists
and chemists which we have cited in our original brief.
After all, in spite of the great ability shown by our
friends in presenting a fallacy, there is but one argument
which really goes to the merits of the case. W e refer to
their contention that even if we assume the water in plaintiff 's dump belongs to the plaintiff,—then after it leaves
plaintiff's dump and it comes upon defendants' surface
and percolates through, the water continues to be the property of the plaintiff. This argument is lucid and to the
point. It involves the final position reached by the trial
court. It is reflected in the statement of respondent at
page 11 of their brief:
"One does not suffer the loss of title to his
property merely because it comes upon the land
of another, although without license and even
against the will of such other."
And, while the position as stated is somewhat forced
and not true to the facts, because the water does not come
upon our land without license, nor does it percolate
against the will of the Utah Copper Company, nevertheless, the abstract proposition at first blush, finds some
support (though indifferent) in cases of fruit blown upon
another's land, straying livestock, and drifting timber.
Finally respondent quotes the case of tallow flowing in the
river Thames. The difficulty, however, for respondent
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is that all of the authorities put water, oil and gas in a
classification entirely different from blown fruit, straying livestock, and drifting timber. Water, oil and gas
have a fugitive character. They are not the subject of
property except while in actual occupancy. (Dark vs.
Johnston, 55 Penn. 164). When they escape and go into
the lands of another the title of the former owner is gone.
((Brown vs. Spilman, 155 U. S. 665).
We have cited numerous cases and discussed the authorities which, without dissent, support the foregoing
proposition. (See pages 46 to 62, inclusive, of our opening
brief). We again call attention to the case of Dtivall vs.
White, 189 Pac. 324, and Humphreys Oil Company vs.
Liles, 262 S. W. 1058, involving the question of rights to
escaping oil.
Since we cited these two cases, and all of the other
cases upon the "fugacious" character of water, oil, gas
and like substances, and the determination of property
rights therein, counsel for respondent has filed two briefs,
and strange, but significant, they have failed to either
distinguish or comment at all concerning the conclusions
reached in these cases. The cases referred to we submit
should control the determination of this case.
Respectfully submitted,
P I E R C E , CRITCHLOW& MARR,
DEY, HOPPAUGH & MARK,
Attorneys

for

Appellants.
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